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Abstract — The paper presents an authentication scheme for 
remote systems using smart card. The scheme prevents the 
scenario of many logged in users with the same login identity, 
and does not require password/verifier table to validate the 
users’ login request. The scheme provides a user-friendly 
password change option, and withstands the replay, 
impersonation, stolen-verifier, guessing, and denial-of-service 
attacks
1
. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Remote system authentication is a process by which a remote 
system gains confidence about the identity of the 
communicating partner. In 1981, Lamport [1] first introduced 
the concept of password-based authentication scheme. 
Afterwards, numerous studies of remote systems authentication 
with emphases on various types of mathematical problems 
(e.g. one-way hash function, public-key setting) have been 
investigated to improve the security and efficiency of the 
scheme. Taking computational cost into consideration, remote 
systems authentication can be classified into two broad 
categories: password-based using one-way hash function and 
public key [2] based techniques. One-way hash function based 
authentication technique is simple and viable for 
implementation in a small handheld device like smart card. In 
contrast, the public-key based technique provides higher 
security with added computational cost. It is observed that 
Lamport’s scheme suffers high hash overhead and the 
necessity for password resetting problems decreases its 
suitability for practical use. Haller [3] proposed a modified 
version of Lamport’s scheme, but the modified version is 
vulnerable to the replay attack. Shimizu [4] proposed a one-
time password authentication scheme on eliminating the 
weaknesses of [1] and [3]. The one-time characteristic is 
gained by using two variable random numbers that are changed 
in every authentication. The user has to memorize two variable 
random numbers or carry with some sort of portable storage 
token, e.g. smart card. In 2000, Sandirigama et al. [5] 
 
1 The preliminary version of this work appeared in the Proc. of the 
Workshop on Information Security, HIT, Haldia, 2006. 
proposed another hash-based strong-password authentication 
scheme, but the scheme is vulnerable [6] to some security 
threats. Later Peyravian and Zunic [7] proposed a hash-based 
password authentication scheme that requires low 
computational efforts. However, Hwang and Yeh [8] showed 
that Peyravian-Zunic’s scheme is vulnerable to password 
guessing, server spoofing, and stolen-verifier attacks. In 2004, 
Das et al. proposed a scheme [9] that provides computational 
efficiency and a user-friendly of password change option. 
Subsequently, a few public-key based remote systems 
authentication schemes and improvements [10], [11], [12], 
[13] have also been proposed. We observe that all these 
schemes provide only one-way authentication, that is, only 
remote server can check the authenticity of a user. The user 
cannot check whether he is communicating with the correct 
server or not. It is a vital gap where a potential adversary can 
spoof the server and get valuable user information. This 
motivates us to construct an authentication scheme for remote 
systems that provides user and server authentication, and the 
user gets access to the remote system’s resource only if <user, 
server>’s authenticity passed correctly. 
To construct the scheme, we use a smart card as the user 
registration token and the merits of “password” and “smart 
card” factors for the remote systems authentication. The use of 
smart card not only make the scheme secure but also prevents 
users from distribution of their login identities, which 
effectively prohibits the scenario of many logged in users with 
the same login-identity (login-ID). This generally happens in 
digital libraries and similar systems, where a subscriber can 
share his login-ID and password with others. The scheme is 
computationally efficient and the remote system does not need 
to maintain any password/verifier table for users login request 
validation. Furthermore, the users are allowed to choose and 
change their preferred passwords without the remote systems 
assistance. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In 
Section 2, we discuss a widely accepted list of security 
properties for remote systems authentication. We present the 
scheme in Section 3. The security and efficiency of the scheme 
are analyzed in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in 
Section 5. 
 II. SECURITY PROPERTIES 
Desirable security properties of various remote systems 
authentication have been evolved over this period. A widely 
accepted list of required properties is given below:  
- Replay Attack: Replay attack is an offensive action 
whereby an adversary can intercept a valid login message 
and then gains access to the remote system by replaying 
the intercepted information. 
- Impersonation Attack: An adversary may impersonate 
user login by forging a login request and acts as a 
legitimate user by logging in to the server. 
- Stolen-verifier Attack: In practice, it is likely that a user 
uses the same password to access several servers for his 
convenience. If an insider of a remote server obtains user 
password, he could impersonate user's login to access 
other servers. Generally, the system, which maintains 
verifier/password table for user's login request 
verification, may suffer from this attack. 
- Guessing Attack: Memorized passwords are subject to 
guessing attacks. The guessing attacks can be classified 
into two types: on-line password guessing attack and off-
line password guessing attack. 
a. On-line password guessing attack: The adversary can 
try to use a guessed password to pass the verification 
of remote server in on-line manner. The server could 
detect the attacks by noticing continuous 
authentication failures. 
b. Off-line password guessing attack: The adversary can 
intercept a valid login request and store them locally. 
Then he would try to find out the password in trial 
and error method, and verify the login request in off-
line manners. Therefore, the remote server could not 
detect the attacks. 
- Denial-of-Service Attack: A denial-of-service attack is an 
offensive action whereby the adversary could use some 
method to work upon the remote server so that the server 
will deny the access requests issued by the legitimate user. 
 
III. PROPOSED SCHEME 
The scheme consists of three phases: registration phase, 
authentication phase and password change phase. The 
registration phase is performed only once, and the 
authentication phase is executed every time when a user wants 
to login to the system. 
 
A. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui wants to register to 
the remote system (RS). The user chooses a password PWi and 
submits it to the RS. Upon receiving the registration request, 
the RS performs the following steps: 
R1. Compute a nonce Ni = h(PWi , IDi) h(x), where x is a 
primary secret key of  RS, h(.) is a one-way hash 
function and  is a bitwise concatenation operator. 
R2. Personalize a smart card with the parameters h(.), IDi, 
Ni, h(PWi) and y. The parameter y is RS’s secondary 
secret number stored in each registered user’s smart 
card. Then, the RS sends the personalized smart card to 
Ui in a secure manner. 
B. Authentication Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever Ui wants to login to the RS. 
The phase is further divided into two parts, namely the User 
authentication and RS authentication. The phases work as 
follows: 
 
User Authentication 
Ui inserts his smart card to a terminal, and keys his identity IDi 
and password PWi. The smart card validates the entered IDi 
and PWi with the stored ones in smart card. If the entered IDi 
and PWi are correct, the smart card performs the following 
operations: 
U1. Compute DIDi=h(PWi , IDi) h(yTu), where Tu is 
timestamp of Ui’s system. 
U2. Compute Ci = h(Ni Tu y). 
U3. Send (DIDi, Ci, Tu) as a login request to the RS over a 
public channel. 
 
Upon receiving the login request (DIDi, Ci, Tu) at time Ts , the 
RS authenticates the Ui by the following steps: 
V1. Verify the validity of the time interval between Tu and 
Ts. If (Ts - Tu)  T then the remote system proceeds to 
the next step, otherwise terminates the request. The T 
denotes the expected valid time interval for the 
transmission delay. 
V2. Compute h(PWi,IDi) = DIDi h(y T). 
V3. Compute Ci*=h(h(PWi , IDi) h(x) Tu y). 
V4. If Ci* = Ci, the RS accepts the login request, rejects 
otherwise. 
 
RS Authentication 
If the user authenticity is passed correctly, the RS’s 
genuineness is ascertained by the following steps: 
S1. Compute Xi = h(h(PWi , IDi) h(x ) TuTs
*
); Ts
*
 is 
timestamp of RS’s system. 
S2. Send (Xi , Ts
*
) to the user over a public channel. 
 
Let the user receives the response at time Tu
*
. Then the smart 
card validates the time interval between Tu
*
 and Ts
*
. If (Tu
*
- 
Ts
*
)  T, it computes Xi
*
 = h(NiTuTs
*
). If Xi
*
=Xi, then the 
RS is authentic and Ui starts accessing the RS’s resource. 
 
 C. Password Change Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever Ui wants to change his 
password. He can easily change his password without taking 
any assistance from the RS. The phase works as follows: 
P1. Ui inserts the smart card into a terminal and submits IDi 
and PWi and requests to change the password. The 
smart card validates the entered IDi and PWi with the 
one that is stored in the smart card. If entered 
parameters are correct, the smart card proceeds to the 
next step, otherwise terminates the operation. 
P2. Ui is prompted to submit a new password, and he 
submits PWi*. 
P3. The smart card computes  
Ni*=Ni h(PWi , IDi) h(PWi
*
,IDi). 
P4. The nonce Ni and PWi will be replaced by Ni
*
 and PWi
*
 
respectively, and it completes the password change 
phase. 
 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SCHEME 
 
A. Security Analysis 
The replication or extraction of parameter from the private 
space of smart card is quite difficult as per the present 
literature. Though it happens by the side channel attacks [14]; 
however, the experiment cost is much higher than the cost of 
the intended parameter. Further, some of the smart card 
manufacturers consider the risk of the side channel attack, and 
provide counter measure to deter the reverse engineering 
attempt. We consider a smart as a secure device. With this 
fact, the proposed scheme withstands the following possible 
threats: 
 
Replay Attack: A replay attack (replaying an intercepted login 
message) cannot work in the scheme. Suppose an attacker 
intercepts a valid login request (DID, C, Tu) and tries to login 
to the RS by replaying the same. The verification of this login 
request will fail because the interval (Ts - Tu) T, a mutually 
agreed transmission delay. Of course, the clock 
synchronization at client and server needs an attention of this 
scheme. We believe that this is an efficient way to resist the 
replay attack, and assume that clock synchronization is being 
taking into account for the proposed scheme.  
 
Impersonation Attack: An attacker cannot impersonate a legal 
login by intercepting (DID, C, Tu). The attacker will have DID, 
but this DID needs to be recomputed with a new timestamp 
Tnew, which is not possible, as it requires PW and y. To get PW 
and/or y from DID one has to break the one-wayness property 
of h(.), which is a hard problem. Now let us see, the capability 
of a valid user to forge a login request. In this case, the user 
knows PW, but obtaining y is again a hard problem. Thus, no 
one (including valid users) can forge a login request. 
 
Stolen-verifier Attack: In practice, it is likely that U uses the 
same password PW to access several servers for his 
convenience. If an insider of the RS obtains PW, he could 
frame U’s login to access other servers. Our scheme resists this 
attack because the insider should need U’s smart card to frame 
U. In our scheme, U initially submits PW to the RS during the 
registration process; however, after registration U is free to 
change his password any time. Further, the RS does not 
maintain any verifier/password table to validate U’s login 
request. Thus, there is no question to steal password and 
thereby execution of the stolen-verifier attack is not possible. 
 
Guessing Attack: The guessing attack is a crucial concern in 
any authentication scheme. We note that our scheme is free 
from password/verifier table, and user password is not traveled 
as a hash of password. Instead, we let password to travel as a 
digest of some other secret components. Therefore, our 
scheme is not suffered by the guessing attacks. 
 
Denial-of-Service Attack: In the password change phase, the 
denial-of-service attack may occur when the RS updates the 
new verifier or password for the next login without checking 
the validation of the entered input. This allows the RS to reject 
all subsequent login requests of a legal user. Therefore, it is 
intuitive to check the any request/input before updating the 
verifier or password. In our scheme, when a user logs into RS 
or wants to change his password, the smart card checks the 
validity of the card owner password before processing any 
instruction. Even, if a smart card is stolen or lost, the party 
who has the smart card cannot login to RS or change the 
password without knowing the card owner’s password. 
Therefore, denial-of-service attack is not possible in our 
scheme. 
 
B. Efficiency 
The smart card personalization cost for the registration process 
of our scheme is at per the schemes in [10], [11], [12], [13]. 
The login and verification phases of these schemes require 
multiple modular arithmetic and hash computation; whereas 
the login and verification phases require only hash 
computation. Therefore, our scheme is computationally 
efficient in comparisons to the schemes [10], [11], [12], [13]. 
As most of the hash-based schemes [1]-[5], [7], [9] suffer from 
the security weakness and our scheme attains its security 
strength against the possible threats, the proposed scheme is 
practical and viable in smart card based authentication 
schemes. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have proposed an efficient remote systems authentication 
scheme that provides the following characteristics: 
- the scheme provides mutual authentication between user 
and remote server. 
- the scheme prevents the scenario of many logged in users 
with the same login identity. 
 - the scheme provides a flexible password change option, 
where users can change their passwords any time without 
any assistance of remote server. 
- the remote server does not require to maintain any 
verifier/password table to validate the login request. 
- the scheme withstands the replay, impersonation, stolen-
verifier, guessing, and denial-of-service attacks. 
In future, the authors will try to avoid the secure channel in the 
registration phase so that the proposed construction would be 
purely public channel based remote systems authentication, 
and this is an interesting and challenging extension of the 
proposed work. 
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